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Terrorist Precursor Offences: Evaluating the Law in Practice 
Andrew Cornford 
 
Abstract: The Terrorism Acts of 2000 and 2006 created a suite of new precursor 
offences related to terrorism. This article critically evaluates these provisions in light of 
how they have been interpreted and applied in practice. It focuses on three especially 
important offences: preparing acts of terrorism, disseminating terrorist publications, and 
collecting information of a kind likely to be useful to a terrorist. All three offences, it is 
concluded, have proved to be problematically broad in their scope, and to some extent 
avoidably so. Notable problems include the offences’ extension to conduct that carries 
little to no real risk of contributing to future terrorist attacks, their implications for 
innocent or even positively valuable conduct, and their likely consequent chilling effects 
on suspect communities. Suggestions are considered as to how these concerns might 
be addressed, while still respecting the offences’ underlying purpose and arguable 




In the Terrorism Acts of 2000 and 2006, Parliament created a suite of new criminal 
offences related to terrorism. The aim of this legislation was not to criminalise terrorist 
attacks themselves – which were, obviously, already caught by the existing law – but 
rather to pre-empt them more effectively. Its strategy was to create a range of new 
precursor offences, which extend criminal liability to even earlier points in potential 
terrorist plots than do the traditional inchoate offences. The new offences include 
expansive provisions related to terrorist organisations,1 financing of terrorism,2 the 
preparation and encouragement of terrorism,3 possession of terrorism-related 
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materials,4 and failure to provide information about suspected terrorist activity.5 All are 
serious offences, carrying sentences of years, decades, or even life imprisonment.  
 
These developments have attracted the attention of legal theorists, who regard them as 
emblematic of a broader “preventive turn” in contemporary criminal law.6 Yet they have 
still attracted surprisingly little broader public and scholarly scrutiny. In particular, even 
after two decades of experience, almost nothing has been said about their 
implementation in practice,7 or the extent to which this has reflected their apparent 
theoretical problems. How have prosecutors used the expansive powers that these 
offences afford them, and how have courts interpreted their often sweeping terms? 
Given their implementation, are they a justifiable use of the criminal law? And if not, 
what could be done to address this? To date, these questions have not been examined 
systematically. This article aims to fill this gap, by critically evaluating the terrorism 
offences in light of how they have been interpreted and applied.  
 
To facilitate depth of analysis, we will focus on three case studies: the offences of 
preparing acts of terrorism, disseminating terrorist publications, and collecting 
information of a kind likely to be useful to a terrorist. The analysis below is based on an 
examination of all reported cases relating to these offences. They are apt case studies 
because they are central to the United Kingdom’s current counter-terrorism strategy,8 
                                                          
4 Terrorism Act 2000, ss. 57 and 58. 
5 Terrorism Act 2000, ss. 19, 38B and 39. 
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Legislation (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2014) 221–228. 
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and are thus among the most frequently prosecuted terrorism offences.9 They are also 
examples of types of precursor offence that have attracted broader critical attention. 
Recent theoretical work has developed sophisticated frameworks for evaluating these 
offences. Social scientific research on terrorism has also developed significantly since 
their enactment. Insights from both bodies of work are drawn upon in evaluating the 
offences below.  
 
The three offences are examined in turn in sections 2 to 4, before section 5 draws some 
broader conclusions. What emerges is the role of the courts in failing to address – and 
sometimes even exacerbating – the problems with these offences. In some cases, 
these problems are an inevitable result of the offences’ drafting. But in others, they are 
due to courts’ interpretive choices, and to prosecutors’ pursuit of at least some cases on 
the offences’ outer reaches. The problems are not necessarily ones of principle. 
Although some would argue that the offences are objectionable at this level, these 
arguments are neither universally accepted nor clearly decisive. The clearer problem is 
rather that the offences’ costs outweigh their benefits at their margins. All catch conduct 
that carries little to no real risk of contributing to future terrorist attacks. All affect 
conduct that is innocent or even positively valuable, and create significant risks of 
chilling effects for suspect communities. Even if they are to be retained in approximately 
their current form, any future reform should thus aim to narrow their scope.  
 
2. Preparing Acts of Terrorism 
 
The centrepiece of the UK regime of terrorism offences is the offence of preparing acts 
of terrorism.10 One commits this offence if one intends either to commit or to assist acts 
of terrorism, and one “engages in any conduct in preparation for giving effect to [this] 
                                                          
9 In fact, they are the three most frequently prosecuted offences that are still in consistent use, and that 
do not form part of a more complex regime (e.g. those relating to terrorist financing or proscribed 
organisations): see Home Office, Operation of Police Powers under the Terrorism Act 2000: Year to 31 
March 2019: Annual Data Tables (2019), table A.05a. Note that the offence of possession for terrorist 
purposes, under s. 57 of the Terrorism Act 2000, has effectively been supplanted by the offence of 
preparing acts of terrorism. 




intention”. The required mens rea for the offence is an intention to commit or assist one 
or more acts of terrorism, in a general sense; one need not intend to commit or assist 
any particular such act.11 The actus reus can then be satisfied by any conduct 
whatsoever that is preparatory to such an intention. The offence carries a maximum 
sentence of imprisonment for life.12  
 
The most remarkable feature of this offence is its sheer breadth. Since it catches any 
preparatory conduct, it can be applied at any stage of terrorist plots between conception 
and completion. At one extreme, it catches preparation so advanced that it would also 
constitute an attempted terrorist act (driving a van into a pedestrian area; putting a 
bomb on a bus). At the other, it catches preparation at such an early stage that it would 
appear outwardly to be entirely innocent (researching van hire prices; downloading a 
bus timetable from the internet). In practice, both these extremes have so far been 
avoided. The most serious cases falling within the offence have typically been 
prosecuted as conspiracies.13 And the least serious cases, where no concrete progress 
has been made towards a terrorist goal, have not led to prosecutions. Between these 
extremes, however, the offence has been used to prosecute a wide variety of conduct. 
The case law is striking for the variety in both the type of conduct targeted and the level 
of its culpability.14  
 
The offence has been used for both direct preparation of terrorist acts and what one 
might call the “preparation of preparation”. Thus, prosecutions have often involved such 
conduct as running or undertaking terrorist training,15 or obtaining or providing supplies, 
                                                          
11 Terrorism Act 2006, s. 5(2). 
12 Terrorism Act 2006, s. 5(3). 
13 For example, conspiracy to murder or to cause explosions: see R v Kahar [2016] EWCA Crim 568, 
[2016] 1 WLR 3156 at [30]–[31]. There are no tactical advantages to using conspiracy charges in these 
cases, rather than charges under the 2006 Act; the practice may simply reflect a view about appropriate 
labelling. 
14 This is reflected in the sentencing guidelines for the offence: see Sentencing Council, Terrorism 
Offences: Definitive Guideline (2018) <www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Terrorism-
offences-definitive-guideline-Web.pdf> accessed 14 February 2020, 5–10. Level of preparation is the 
main factor affecting culpability under the guideline, and ranges from “very limited” in the lowest category 
to “complete” or close to complete in the highest. 




such as weapons, military equipment, and explosive materials.16 But they have also 
involved, for example, organising travel abroad with a view to receiving training,17 or 
downloading information about supplies from the internet.18 They have even involved 
merely discussing these things with others, or contacting others for the purpose of 
discussing them. This has occurred most often in the context of terrorist groups with 
many participants, who are involved in a plot to varying degrees: prosecutors will charge 
all participants with preparation, even those whose involvement extends only to 
discussion of the plan.19 But occasionally, contacting others with a terrorist purpose has 
been the object of prosecution by itself. In the case of Ulhaq, for example, contacting an 
Islamic State fighter sufficed for a preparation conviction, even though the defendant 
never joined that group or became involved in its plans.20 
 
Are such broad-ranging preparation offences a legitimate use of the criminal law? At the 
level of principle, commentators disagree. For some, such as Alexander and Ferzan, 
the criminalisation of preparatory conduct is inherently illegitimate. Preparatory actors, 
they point out, have not yet caused or unleashed any risk of harm, and they can avoid 
doing so simply by changing their minds. Therefore, we should not punish preparatory 
actors21 – or at least, we should avoid intervening until the last possible moment at 
which we can thwart their plans.22 Others argue, by contrast, that preparatory conduct 
                                                          
1 Cr App R (S) 54. 
16 See e.g. R v Tabbakh [2009] EWCA Crim 464, [2010] Crim LR 79; R v Roddis [2009] EWCA Crim 585; 
R v Khan (Parviz) [2009] EWCA Crim 1085, [2010] 1 Cr App R (S) 35; R v Khan [2013] EWCA Crim 468. 
17 See e.g. R v Dart [2014] EWCA Crim 2158. 
18 See e.g. R v Iqbal [2014] EWCA Crim 2158. 
19 This was explicitly affirmed in Iqbal (ibid). The Court of Appeal emphasised that both more and less 
serious involvement can suffice for an offence under section 5; it did not matter that, in the case of some 
of the defendants, their involvement had never progressed beyond discussion. 
20 R v Ulhaq [2016] EWCA Crim 2209. 
21 L Alexander and KK Ferzan, Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2009) ch. 6; L Alexander and KK Ferzan, ‘Danger: The Ethics of Preemptive Action’ (2012) 9 Ohio 
State Journal of Criminal Law 637; L Alexander and KK Ferzan, ‘Risk and Inchoate Crimes: Retribution or 
Prevention?’ in GR Sullivan and Ian Dennis (eds), Seeking Security: Pre-empting the Commission of 
Criminal Harms (Hart 2012). 
22 S Wallerstein, ‘Criminalising Remote Harm and the Case of Anti-Democratic Activity’ (2007) 28 
Cardozo Law Review 2697. For other arguments for similar results, see e.g. P Ramsay, ‘Preparation 
Offences, Security Interests, Political Freedom’ in RA Duff and others (eds), The Structures of Criminal 
Law (Oxford University Press 2011) 214–220; P Asp, ‘Preventionism and Criminalization of 
Nonconsummate Offences’ in A Ashworth, L Zedner and P Tomlin (eds), Prevention and the Limits of the 




can sometimes be justly punished. Acting on an intention to cause wrongful harm, these 
commentators claim, is arguably wrong in itself.23 Alternatively, it is wrong to the extent 
that, by taking steps towards that intention, one makes it more likely that the harm will 
be caused.24 On these views, offences of preparation are not inherently illegitimate – 
although as we shall see, we should still be cautious about criminalising preparation at 
early stages.  
 
Which of these views we should adopt cannot, of course, be settled by examining 
current practice. However, many people’s instinct is that preparatory conduct is 
sometimes legitimately punishable, and cases at the more serious end of the terrorist 
preparation offence illustrate why. Consider the 2013 case of Khan, which involved a 
large network of prospective terrorists from across the country.25 Over several months, 
this group developed plans for attacks, including one on the London Stock Exchange. 
They had made plans for recruitment, obtaining supplies, and setting up training camps, 
and had begun arranging the details of particular possible attacks. Some of them had 
got as far as building a bomb before they were arrested. Although this conduct falls 
short of being a criminal attempt, many would have felt discomfort about the group 
escaping any form of criminal liability. Such outcomes force enforcement authorities to 
choose between stopping terrorist plots and securing conviction of the plotters. But that, 
one might think, is too stark a choice.26 This feeling suggests sympathy for the view that 
                                                          
23 See e.g. RA Duff, ‘Risks, Culpability and Criminal Liability’ in GR Sullivan and I Dennis (eds), Seeking 
Security: Pre-empting the Commission of Criminal Harms (Hart 2012); V Tadros, Wrongs and Crimes 
(Oxford University Press 2016) ch. 16. A variation on this view holds that, while acting on an intention to 
do wrong can sometimes be wrongful, some types of conduct remain inherently innocent: AP Simester, 
‘Prophylactic Crimes’ in GR Sullivan and I Dennis (eds), Seeking Security: Pre-empting the Commission 
of Criminal Harms (Hart 2012) 73–76. 
24 D Ohana, ‘Desert and Punishment for Acts Preparatory to the Commission of a Crime’ (2007) 20 
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 113, 117–126; S Bock and F Stark, ‘Preparatory Offences’ in 
K Ambos and others (eds), Core Concepts in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Volume I (Cambridge 
University Press 2020). Note that these two views of the wrongness of preparatory conduct are potentially 
consistent with one another. 
25 [2013] EWCA Crim 468. 
26 The Law Commission took this consideration to be decisive in favour of retaining some criminal liability 
for preparation: see Law Commission, Conspiracy and Attempts (Consultation Paper no 183, 2007), parts 
14 and 15. For the opposing view – on which preventive restrictions of liberty are sufficient, and there is 
no need to convict preparatory actors – see KK Ferzan, ‘Beyond Crime and Commitment: Justifying 




preparatory conduct can legitimately be punished in some cases.   
 
Even if preparatory offences can be legitimate in principle, however, the criminalisation 
of early-stage preparation remains problematic. Generally, it is more difficult to justify 
criminalising the earlier than the later stages of criminal preparation, for two reasons. 
First, we generally have weaker reason to criminalise early-stage preparation than we 
do late-stage preparation. For both the dangerousness and the culpability of such 
conduct tend to vary depending on how far the plan has progressed. At early stages, 
conduct may do little or nothing to make the plan more likely to succeed. The actor’s 
intentions may also remain vague and conditional, and may not reflect deep 
commitment to the planned crime. The marginal benefits of criminalising such conduct 
thus tend to be relatively low – in terms of both facilitating its prevention and ensuring 
that it is met with a censuring and punitive response.27 
 
These generalisations hold for at least some of the conduct against which the terrorist 
preparation offence has been used. Admittedly, the seriousness of the planned offence 
must be taken into account here, and in the context of terrorism, this can of course be 
very high.28 However, it does not follow that our reasons to criminalise terrorist 
preparation are especially strong. For one thing, acts of terrorism, as defined in the 
legislation, extend far beyond the bombings and mass murders that the label typically 
evokes. They also include, for example, serious damage to property and interference 
with electronic systems, as well as mere threats or single acts of violence.29  
 
For another, seriousness is anyway not the sole decisive factor: it does not 
                                                          
27 Ohana (n 24) 117–131. 
28 Hence the not-unreasonable view that “defending further up the field” provides a compelling 
justification for special counter-terrorism powers: see David Anderson, ‘Shielding the Compass: How to 
Fight Terrorism without Defeating the Law’ [2013] European Human Rights Law Review 233, 237–240. 
29 These all constitute acts of terrorism if they are “designed to influence the government… or to 
intimidate the public”, with “the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause”: 
Terrorism Act 2000, s. 1. An arguable problem with all the offences examined here is that their scope 
depends on this broad definition: see J Simon and L Zedner, ‘Countering Terrorism at the Limits of 
Criminal Liability in England and Wales’ in M Dyson and B Vogel (eds), The Limits of Criminal Law: 




automatically justify criminalising conduct that is of little or no significance to the 
success of a potential terrorist act.30 Surprisingly little research has examined which 
types of preparatory conduct are the best predictors of such acts. But some researchers 
have begun to generalise about the planning cycles through which terrorists go.31 
Based on their findings, we have relatively strong reason to criminalise acquiring 
weapons, building bombs, or final recruitment for attacks. But we have only weak 
reason to criminalise meetings, communications, or research into methods or targets. 
Even participation in terrorist training might not indicate that an attack is imminent. We 
should therefore question the strength of our reasons for defining and using this offence 
in such a broad-ranging way.  
 
The second ground for caution about criminalising early-stage preparation is that we 
have stronger reason against criminalising this conduct than we do for late-stage 
preparation. For at early stages, criminal intention can be difficult to identify: it can be 
difficult to distinguish from fantasy or obsession.32 Criminalising early-stage preparation 
therefore carries several risks. Most importantly, it carries a greater risk of unjustly 
convicting those who do not really intend to cause harm. But it also carries risks even 
for those who are not eventually convicted. Gathering evidence of intention requires 
intrusive investigative methods. This, in turn, risks creating chilling effects: to avoid 
contact with the criminal justice system, one must avoid even innocent conduct that 
might be regarded as suspicious. These effects will be especially severe for members of 
the communities on whom authorities focus, and whose security from criminal justice 
intervention is already relatively low.33 Again, experience with the terrorist preparation 
offence suggests that these risks are real in this context.  
                                                          
30 Ohana (n 24) 139–140. 
31 See generally BL Smith, P Roberts and KR Damphousse, ‘The Terrorists’ Planning Cycle: Patterns of 
Pre-Incident Behaviour’ in G LaFree and JD Freilich (eds), The Handbook of the Criminology of Terrorism 
(Wiley Blackwell 2017); N Bouhana and others, ‘Lone Actor Terrorism: Radicalisation, Attack Planning 
and Execution’ in A Silke (ed), Routledge Handbook of Terrorism and Counterterrorism (Routledge 2019) 
116–120. 
32 See e.g. Alexander and Ferzan, ‘Risk and Inchoate Crimes’ (n 21) 111. 
33 An important point about over-breadth in terrorism legislation is that its effects will be felt primarily by 
these communities. This raises concerns about distributive justice, alongside the other concerns raised 





The risks arise partly from the substantive law. As we have noted, intention to commit 
any specific act of terrorism is not required; intention to commit “acts of terrorism” in 
general will suffice. Thus, in the case of Farooqi, the defendant was convicted of this 
offence and imprisoned for life, even though a lengthy undercover police operation had 
failed to find evidence of his involvement in any particular plot.34 Moreover, as per the 
usual rule, intention here must include conditional intention.35 That is, it will suffice that 
the defendant intended to commit acts of terrorism, provided that certain conditions 
obtain. At the early stages of criminal plans, these conditions may be numerous, and 
the chance of their obtaining very low.36 Therefore, not only may one be convicted of 
this offence without being involved in a specific plot; one need not even have been likely 
to become involved in one. Such general and conditional intentions are more easily 
confused with fantasy than are firm intentions to commit a specific offence.  
 
More importantly, risks also arise from what courts accept as evidence of terrorist 
intention. In early-stage preparation cases, this evidence tends to be primarily 
circumstantial: there may be no credible statement of terrorist intention, and this cannot 
be inferred from the alleged preparatory conduct itself. Key sources of such evidence 
have been defendants’ associations with known terrorists, and terrorism-related 
materials found in their possession. The latter have included such items as weapons 
and bomb-making ingredients, but also instructional and propaganda materials.37 
Contrast this with cases of later-stage preparation. In these cases, there is typically 
direct and unambiguous evidence of terrorist intention, and defendants therefore plead 
guilty.38 In early-stage cases, on the other hand, intention is typically the main issue 
                                                          
34 R v Farooqi [2013] EWCA Crim 1649, [2014] 1 Cr App R 8. 
35 See AP Simester and others, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine (6th edn, Hart 
2016) 147. It should be noted that this point has not been explicitly addressed in the case law on this 
offence. 
36 See Alexander and Ferzan, ‘Risk and Inchoate Crimes’ (n 21) 111–115. 
37 See e.g. Tabbakh [2009] EWCA Crim 464; Roddis [2009] EWCA Crim 585; R v Iqbal [2010] EWCA 
Crim 3215; Coney [2012] NIQB 110; Ulhaq [2016] EWCA Crim 2209. 
38 The evidence is often derived from covert surveillance: see e.g. Khan [2009] EWCA Crim 1085; Khan 
[2013] EWCA Crim 468; Dart [2014] EWCA Crim 2158. In Sarwar [2015] EWCA Crim 1886, a police 




contested at trial. The admissibility of circumstantial evidence as proof of terrorist 
intention is therefore a crucial question.  
 
To date, the Court of Appeal has considered this question in just one short judgment, in 
the 2009 case of Roddis.39 The charges in this case related to the defendant’s 
acquisition of instructions and ingredients for making a bomb. The issue was whether 
this was action on a terrorist intention, or whether, as he claimed, he had acted out of 
fascination and morbid curiosity. Some of his conduct was arguably consistent with his 
being an attention-seeker with an unhealthy obsession.40 However, the prosecution 
pointed to extremist videos found in his possession, including several videos of 
beheadings that were shown to the jury in edited form. The appellate court found that 
this evidence was both relevant and not unfairly prejudicial. A careful warning to the jury 
was sufficient to address its potential prejudicial effects.41 And on its relevance, the 
court held: 
 
The possession and content of as many as 19 beheading videos was, as it 
seems to us, relevant… It was inevitably part of the relevance of the material how 
powerful and distressing it was, because the case against the appellant was not 
simply that he had seen it but that he kept it and had a total of 19 similar videos. 
There was evidence that such videos might to an extent “do the rounds” among 
young people who had no terrorist intent. That was a legitimate and relevant 
argument available to the defence… It does not however mean that it was 
irrelevant to the jury to see what it was the defendant had chosen to keep.42  
 
While the sentiment behind this decision is understandable, it is not careful enough. As 
always with such evidence, the key question is whether it really renders the defendant’s 
guilt more likely, or whether it remains consistent with other hypotheses (in this case, 
                                                          
39 [2009] EWCA Crim 585. 
40 For example, he was initially arrested after having boarded a bus with a hoax bomb, wearing what 
were described as “an obviously false beard and glasses”: [2009] EWCA Crim 585 at [2]. 
41 [2009] EWCA Crim 585 at [14]–[15]. 




morbid curiosity). In this light, the admission that such videos are in more general 
circulation should have been seen to significantly damage the prosecution case. For 
combined with the extreme rarity of prospective terrorists among the general population, 
it implies that the probative value of such evidence is relatively low.43  
 
This view is supported by consistent research findings both within and outwith the 
context of terrorism. These findings suggest that interest in extremist materials – and 
even actually holding extremist beliefs – are only weakly correlated with extremist 
behaviour.44 Further research suggests that these materials are likely to have a 
prejudicial effect on jurors: they are likely to cause strong emotional reactions 
associated with a higher propensity to convict.45 Shocking images such as beheading 
videos are especially likely to have this effect – which may not be remedied, and might 
even be exacerbated, by judicial warnings.46 This is not to argue against any use of 
circumstantial evidence in proving terrorist intention. Perhaps other such evidence, such 
as association with known terrorists, does not carry the risks that extremist materials do. 
The point is rather that we should take seriously research addressing the relevance and 
prejudicial effects of such evidence, which might cast doubt on the admissibility of some 
of its types.  
 
This point is important, because Roddis, while the only appeal on the point, is not an 
isolated case. For example, in the case of Tabbakh, the evidence of intention consisted 
entirely of videos and propaganda materials found in the defendant’s possession, and 
                                                          
43 This claim would be countered to an extent if genuine prospective terrorists were very likely to possess 
such videos. However, the court did not argue that this was the case, and the other cases considered in 
this section do not suggest that it is. 
44 For summaries and further references, see e.g. JP Sawyer and J Hienz, ‘What Makes Them Do It? 
Individual-Level Indicators of Extremist Outcomes’ in G LaFree and JD Freilich (eds), The Handbook of 
the Criminology of Terrorism (Wiley Blackwell 2017) 49; J Monahan, ‘The Individual Risk Assessment of 
Terrorism: Recent Developments’ in G LaFree and JD Freilich (eds), The Handbook of the Criminology of 
Terrorism (Wiley Blackwell 2017) 522–523. 
45 J Goodman-Delahunty, ‘Assessing Unfair Prejudice from Extremist Images in Terrorism Trials’ in D Tait 
and J Goodman-Delahunty (eds), Juries, Science and Popular Culture in the Age of Terror (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2017). 




his failure to give evidence to explain these away.47 Again, this was an early-stage 
preparation case, in which the conduct itself did not indicate a high risk of a terrorist 
attack. The conviction therefore turned entirely on the jury’s acceptance of this 
evidence. If we are to be sure of avoiding unsafe convictions in such cases, greater 
caution is required.  
 
Taken together, the above points also have wider implications for liberty interests. 
These implications are somewhat concerning even in more serious cases, given the 
reliance in these cases on covert surveillance. But again, they are more concerning in 
less serious cases. To avoid falling under suspicion, one must now avoid any conduct 
that authorities might take to suggest a general terrorist intention. As just noted, this 
might include an interest in extremist materials or contact with other suspected 
terrorists. For those most likely to be suspected, the offence has thus affected freedom 
of association and the freedom to explore controversial views. These chilling effects 
yield cause for concern, even if we agree that preparatory conduct might in principle be 
legitimately punished.  
 
Overall, the offence of preparing acts of terrorism has proved only somewhat less broad 
in practice than it appears on paper. Perhaps inevitably, it has therefore been used in 
both more and less problematic ways. On the one hand, cases at its more serious end – 
involving advanced preparation for specific terrorist attacks – seem relatively 
unproblematic. Although some oppose offences like this in principle, others will take 
such cases to illustrate their justifiability. On the other hand, cases at its less serious 
end – involving the earliest of concrete steps towards a general and still conditional 
terrorist intention – demonstrate its problems. We have only relatively weak reasons to 
criminalise such conduct, and there are risks to prosecutions that rest primarily upon the 
defendant’s interest in or association with extremism. This suggests that, even if we 
might legitimately criminalise some terrorist preparation, an offence catching any such 
conduct is too broad.  
                                                          





Could courts do anything to address this concern? Probably not much: the scope of the 
preparation offence may be broad, but it is entirely clear. A future Court of Appeal 
should take more seriously the arguments made in Roddis: courts ought to question the 
probative value of different types of circumstantial evidence, and to consider whether 
warnings to juries suffice to address their prejudicial effects. But beyond this, judicial 
intervention is limited by the clear terms of the statute. Intention to commit any specific 
act of terrorism is explicitly not required. And it is likewise explicit that any preparatory 
action will suffice for the actus reus. Problematic though these elements of the offence 
may be, Parliament would thus need to take responsibility for any meaningful reform.48  
 
3. Disseminating Terrorist Publications 
 
The Terrorism Act 2006 created new offences related to the assistance, 
encouragement, and “glorification” of terrorism. The most frequently prosecuted is the 
offence of disseminating terrorist publications, under section 2.49 The actus reus of this 
offence has two elements. First, the defendant must have disseminated a publication in 
a specified way. These include offering the publication for sale, posting it on the 
internet, and possessing it “with a view to” disseminating it, as well as actually giving, 
selling, lending, or otherwise distributing it to others.50 
 
Second, what is disseminated must be a terrorist publication. These come in two 
varieties: publications that assist and publications that encourage terrorism.51 Since the 
                                                          
48 Cf. R Kelly, ‘The Right to a Fair Trial and the Problem of Pre-inchoate Offences’ [2017] European 
Human Rights Law Review 596. 
49 This offence has been used much more frequently than the companion offence of encouraging 
terrorism, under s. 1 of the 2006 Act: see Home Office, Operation of Police Powers under the Terrorism 
Act 2000: Year to 31 March 2019: Annual Data Tables (2019), table A.05a. The two offences share many 
elements in common, so most of the observations below could also be applied mutatis mutandis to the s. 
1 offence. 
50 Terrorism Act 2006, s. 2(2). This element of the offence has proved unproblematic, although it is worth 
noting that its breadth has been fully utilised: for example, some prosecutions have related to mere 
possession with a view to dissemination. See e.g. R v Rahman [2008] EWCA Crim 1465; [2008] 4 All ER 
661. 




offence is used mostly for publications in the latter “encouragement” category, these will 
be our focus here.52 Publications fall into this category if they are likely “to be 
understood by a reasonable person as a direct or indirect encouragement or other 
inducement… to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism”. These 
include publications that glorify terrorism, and from which “a person could reasonably be 
expected to infer that what is being glorified is being glorified as conduct that should be 
emulated by him in existing circumstances”.53 It is irrelevant, however, whether the 
publication in fact encourages anyone to commit or prepare terrorist acts.54 
 
The required mens rea is either intention to assist or encourage terrorism by 
disseminating the publication, or recklessness as to these effects.55 In cases of merely 
reckless encouragement, a defence is available: the publication “neither expressed [the 
defendant’s] views nor had his endorsement”, and it was “clear, in all the 
circumstances” that this was the case.56 The maximum sentence for the offence was 
recently increased from seven to 15 years’ imprisonment.57 
 
The most significant question raised by these provisions is what publications fall within 
the “encouragement” category – especially under the heading of “indirect 
encouragement”. Can a publication reasonably be understood as encouragement of 
terrorism simply because it might have encouraging effects? Or must its meaning or 
message be inherently encouraging in some way? Remarkably, these questions have 
almost never been considered at the appellate level – despite the lack of guidance on 
                                                          
52 This pattern may be due partly to the overlap between the “assistance” limb of the offence and the 
offence of collecting terrorist information, considered in the next section. Until recently, the latter offence 
carried a longer maximum sentence, so prosecutors had reason to prefer it in cases of overlap. Indeed, 
the only two reported appeals relating to the assistance limb also involved collection of information 
charges: R v Iqbal [2010] EWCA Crim 3215; R v Brown (Terence Roy) [2011] EWCA Crim 2751, [2012] 2 
Cr App R (S) 10. In neither case did the court discuss the relationship between the two offences, or clarify 
which charges related to which materials. 
53 Terrorism Act 2006, s. 2(4). 
54 Terrorism Act 2006, s. 2(8). 
55 Terrorism Act 2006, s. 2(1). 
56 Terrorism Act 2006, s. 2(9)–(10). 




them in the legislation and the controversy that they attracted during its passage.58 
Seemingly, however, the answer is that potential encouraging effects will themselves 
suffice: an inherently encouraging meaning or message is not required.  
 
The best illustration of this point is the frequent use of this offence to prosecute the 
dissemination of mere depictions or descriptions of terrorism. These cases suggest that, 
when terrorism is the subject, a publication can easily be “understood as indirect 
encouragement” – even where such encouragement is neither expressed nor 
necessarily implied. For example, several prosecutions have related to videos of 
terrorist acts, or of terrorist techniques and training. Apparently, these can constitute 
terrorist publications even when they do not include any explicit encouraging or 
glorifying message.59 Similar examples include historical and biographical materials, 
such as interviews with known terrorists;60 a letter from the defendants’ friend that 
described his experiences of fighting in Pakistan;61 and a photo that the defendant had 
taken of herself in what appeared to be a suicide vest.62 Presumably, these constitute 
indirect encouragement because they tend to normalise terrorism, or to cast it in a 
positive or sympathetic light – although again, since courts have not been explicit about 
this, it is hard to be sure.  
 
Although the dissemination offence is broad on its face, such extensive use was not 
inevitable. The offence was created partly to implement international obligations, which 
required the criminalisation of intentional but indirect forms of terrorist incitement.63 The 
                                                          
58 See the discussions in A Hunt, ‘Criminal Prohibitions on Direct and Indirect Encouragement of 
Terrorism’ [2007] Criminal Law Review 441, 448–449; T Choudhury, ‘The Terrorism Act 2006: 
Discouraging Terrorism’ in I Hare and J Weinstein (eds), Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford 
University Press 2009) 468–470. This lack of guidance also creates concerns about fair warning: Simon 
and Zedner (n 29) 418. 
59 See e.g. R v Mohammed [2008] EWCA Crim 1465, [2008] 4 All ER 661; Iqbal [2010] EWCA Crim 
3215; R v Ali [2018] EWCA Crim 547, [2018] 1 WLR 6105. Note that videos of terrorist techniques and 
training might also be covered by the “assistance” limb of the offence. 
60 See e.g. R v Faraz [2012] EWCA Crim 2820; [2013] 1 WLR 2615. 
61 Rahman [2008] EWCA Crim 1465. 
62 R v Khan [2015] EWCA Crim 1341; [2015] 2 Cr App R (S) 76. 
63 In particular, the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (CETS No. 196, 2005), 
Art. 5. A similar obligation was later included in EU Directive 2017/541, Art. 5. As has been widely noted, 




then-Government also wanted to criminalise generalised forms of incitement: for 
example, justification of or apology for terrorism, and the explicitly-included glorification 
of terrorism.64 Thus, the offence was always going to catch, for example, a pamphlet 
called “44 Ways to Support Jihad”,65 or YouTube videos of insurgent attacks with 
commentary explicitly praising them.66 Beyond such cases, however, Government and 
commentators alike assumed that the offence would be interpreted narrowly.67 In fact, 
prosecutors have taken advantage of the interpretive latitude that the legislation affords, 
and this has not yet been limited by appellate courts.  
 
Commentators disagree about the legitimacy in principle of such broad offences of 
encouraging crime. On one popular view, advocated most influentially by Simester and 
von Hirsch, they are illegitimate almost by definition. This view begins with the 
assumption that, ordinarily, we are responsible only for our own actions, and not those 
of others. Just because your actions increase the probability that I will do something 
wrong, it does not follow that your actions are also wrong.68 Perhaps you can be held 
responsible if you directly and intentionally incited my actions. But you should not be 
held responsible merely because you expressed support for an ideology that might 
encourage terrorism, or because you published a portrayal of terrorist activity that 
others might imitate.69 On this view, the dissemination offence – even to the extent that 
it catches glorification of or apology for terrorism – is difficult to defend.  
 
                                                          
58) 442; Choudhury (n 58) 470–472; A Petzsche, ‘The Penalization of Public Provocation to Commit a 
Terrorist Offence’ (2017) 7 European Criminal Law Review 241, 248. 
64 See HL Deb 5 December 2005, vol. 676, col. 455; HC Deb 15 February 2006, vol. 442, col. 1437. 
65 Khan v Chief Constable of West Midlands [2017] EWHC 2185. 
66 R v Gul [2013] UKSC 64; [2014] AC 1260. 
67 See Hunt (n 58) 452–457. 
68 See e.g. AP Simester and A von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs: On the Principles of 
Criminalisation (Hart 2011) 79–81; Ashworth and Zedner (n 6) 111–113; Bock and Stark (n 24) 71–75. 
69 See e.g. Wallerstein (n 22) 2727–2728; Simester and von Hirsch (ibid) 82–83; Lord Carlile and S 
Macdonald, ‘The Criminalisation of Terrorists’ Online Preparatory Acts’ in TM Chen, L Jarvis and S 
Macdonald (eds), Cyberterrorism: Understanding, Assessment, and Response (Springer 2014) 165–166; 
A Petzsche and M Cancio Meliá, ‘Speaking of Terrorism and Terrorist Speech: Defining the Limits of 
Terrorist Speech Offences’ in G Lennon, C King and C McCartney (eds), Counter-terrorism, 





On a competing view, we cannot draw simple conclusions about the legitimacy of such 
offences. This view begins with the opposite assumption to the previous one: you 
cannot deny responsibility for risks that you create, simply because they take the form 
of harms that I will ultimately cause. If your actions might contribute to my committing a 
crime, then you must count this risk against them, to at least some extent.70 Even on 
this view, however, we should be cautious about the creation of encouragement 
offences. The risk of encouragement involved may be small or illusory, and the social 
value of the conduct constituting the encouragement may be great. Criminalising such 
conduct might also create further chilling effects on political and religious speech.71 
Thus, there may be room in theory for an offence extending beyond direct incitement of 
terrorism, but we must carefully weigh its benefits against its costs.  
 
Experience raises concerns that the costs of the dissemination offence may outweigh its 
benefits. First, it catches conduct that creates little real risk of encouraging terrorism. In 
this respect, the offence has proved to be as broad in practice as it appears on paper: a 
publication can be a terrorist publication even if no-one is in fact encouraged by it. In the 
2015 case of Khan, for example, the defendant was prosecuted in relation to four 
messages that she had posted on Facebook.72 One count related to the following post: 
“Dear sisters if you love your sons, your husbands and your brothers prove it by sending 
them to fight for the sake of Allah. Don't you want them to enter Jannah [paradise] 
without reckoning?”73 These messages reached only the defendant’s 241 Facebook 
friends, none of whom was encouraged by them. But as the legislation makes clear, this 
was irrelevant to her conviction, and her total sentence of five years and three months’ 
imprisonment was upheld on appeal.  
                                                          
70 See e.g. J Feinberg, Harm to Others (Oxford University Press 1984) 232–237; A Cornford, ‘Indirect 
Crimes’ (2013) 32 Law and Philosophy 485, 489–494; L Alexander and KK Ferzan, Reflections on Crime 
and Culpability: Problems and Puzzles (Cambridge University Press 2018) 18–26. Others argue for a 
middle ground view: while we doubtless have some obligations to avoid contributing to others’ potential 
wrongdoing, there is no simple answer as to which such obligations we have. See e.g. RA Duff, 
‘Criminalizing Endangerment’ in RA Duff and SP Green (eds), Defining Crimes: Essays on the Special 
Part of the Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2005) 62–64; Duff (n 23) 137–138. 
71 Feinberg (ibid) 238–240; Cornford (ibid) 497–502. 
72 Khan [2015] EWCA Crim 1341. 





This concern is strengthened by research on radicalisation – which, although still in its 
infancy, has developed since the passage of the 2006 Act. This suggests that, while 
terrorist propaganda materials often play a role in radicalisation, exposure to them is not 
itself a risk factor. Other factors are more important: especially, social ties to extremists 
who can indoctrinate one into violent ideologies, and grievance-based motivations that 
render one receptive to these ideologies.74 Moreover, as we have already noted, 
extremist interests and beliefs are not themselves predictors of extremist behaviour. 
This casts doubt on the assumptions that seem to underlie the dissemination offence.  
 
Second, this offence has had a significant impact on liberty interests. This is due partly 
to the range of publications that it catches. Since it apparently requires only a potential 
encouraging effect, it curtails a range of freedoms: most obviously, the freedoms to 
discuss controversial topics openly, and to share moral, political, and religious opinions. 
Arguably, there is value simply in being free to engage in such expression, unrestricted 
by others’ potential wrongdoing.75 But more significantly, such expression can itself be 
valuable. The potential value of depictions or accounts of terrorism is obvious: not least 
of all, in understanding and thus combating terrorism itself. And even glorification and 
justification of terrorism should not automatically be assumed to be worthless. Again, we 
must bear in mind here the statutory definition of terrorism:76 this encompasses 
politically-motivated violence against any government of any kind. Encouraging 
terrorism thus includes encouraging justified freedom-fighting against illegitimate 
regimes.77 
                                                          
74 For summaries of the literature, see e.g. Sawyer and Hienz (n 44); D Webber and AW Kruglanski, 
‘Psychological Factors in Radicalization: A “3 N” Approach’ in G LaFree and JD Freilich (eds), The 
Handbook of the Criminology of Terrorism (Wiley Blackwell 2017); Monahan (n 44); Z Reeve, ‘Terrorist 
Psychology and Radicalisation’ in A Silke (ed), Routledge Handbook of Terrorism and Counterterrorism 
(Routledge 2019). It must be noted that the research remains limited, for an obvious reason: it is difficult, 
if not impossible, to obtain access to primary data sources. 
75 Plausibly, this has some effect on the justifiability of conduct that risks encouraging others to cause to 
harm – especially where that risk is very low. See Alexander and Ferzan (n 70) 24–26. 
76 Terrorism Act 2000, s. 1. 
77 Gul [2013] UKSC 64. Although especially significant in the context of this offence, the point is a more 
general one: for the purposes of the terrorism offences, “noble cause terrorism” is no less a form of 





The range of publications caught is especially problematic when combined with the 
offence’s permissive mens rea element. As we have seen, the offence criminalises 
reckless as well as intentional encouragement. Recklessness as to encouragement of 
terrorism means awareness of an unreasonable risk that one’s conduct would 
encourage terrorism.78 The offence therefore catches encouragement that is an 
unwelcome side-effect of some other purpose, such as the dissemination of knowledge 
about terrorism, or the expression of political or religious opinion. Again, this breadth 
has been reflected in practice, with cases of purely reckless, admittedly unintentional 
encouragement leading to convictions.79 
 
Still more concerningly, the requirement for recklessness as to encouragement has 
proved undemanding in practice. In fact, in at least one case, the defendant seems to 
have been convicted despite having not been reckless: according to a pre-sentence 
report, which the trial judge seemingly accepted, the defendant did not believe that the 
publications he sold were dangerous or that they would interest genuine terrorists.80 
Even when courts have acknowledged the requirement, they have found it to be met 
fairly readily. In particular, they have focused on the “awareness” element of 
recklessness, rather than the “unreasonableness” element: if defendants were aware of 
a risk that their conduct would encourage terrorism, then the court will likely assume 
that risk to be unreasonable.81 Although this tendency is not unique to this context,82 it 
is particularly notable here. Again, the materials concerned may have some positive 
value, and they may carry little risk of encouragement, so the justifiability of these risks 
is especially important to the justifiability of their criminalisation.  
 
                                                          
78 See the brief remarks in Mohammed [2008] EWCA Crim 1465 at [34] and [36]; and, more generally, R 
v G [2003] UKHL 50, [2004] 1 AC 1034. 
79 See e.g. Mohammed [2008] EWCA Crim 1465; Brown [2011] EWCA Crim 2751. 
80 Brown [2011] EWCA Crim 2751. 
81 See e.g. Mohammed [2008] EWCA Crim 1465 at [36]. 
82 Indeed, the question has almost never been addressed of when a risk is unreasonable for the purpose 
of finding recklessness. This is perhaps because this question is deemed to be, quintessentially, one for 
the jury: see F Stark, Culpable Carelessness: Recklessness and Negligence in the Criminal Law 




A powerful illustration of all these points is the case of Mohammed.83 The defendant in 
this case was a convert to Islam who sold Islamic literature at book stalls. Although 
most of this literature was not caught by the dissemination offence, some of it included 
“recordings of terrorist training, extracts from the lives of terrorists and glorification of 
terrorist activities and those who committed them”.84 The prosecution accepted that he 
had no intention to encourage terrorism, and that his conduct was not especially 
dangerous: many of the materials concerned were easily accessible online anyway. 
However, he could nevertheless be convicted, because his actions were reckless: for all 
he knew, the material might have fallen into the hands of people whom it would 
encourage. In assessing his appeal against sentence, the Court of Appeal recognised 
some mitigating factors: he was openly carrying on a business that was entirely legal 
until the 2006 Act came into force, and the line between legal and illegal material was 
not entirely clear (!). Nevertheless, they still thought it necessary to impose a significant 
custodial sentence, and they reduced his term of imprisonment only from three to two 
years.  
 
These points also suggest a risk of chilling effects.85 For those who want even to 
explore or discuss controversial views about terrorism – for example, those in a line of 
work like Mohammed’s – it is now difficult to be sure of avoiding suspicion. Freedom of 
expression is no defence; nor are good intentions, nor that the risk of encouragement 
was small. Nor could one rely on the requirement that the risk of encouragement be 
unreasonable: based on cases like Mohammed, one might get the impression that 
awareness of some such risk suffices for liability. Widely-reported incidents show that 
these fears have had a real impact. For example, the British Library declined for this 
reason to curate the Taliban Sources Project: a collection of thousands of primary 
materials translated into English, designed to shed light on the Taliban and its 
operations.86 But again, the invisible likely impact on suspect communities is arguably 
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more concerning. For members of these communities, a risk of contact with the criminal 
justice system is now the price of some forms of expression.87  
 
Are these concerns addressed by the defence for reckless encouragement cases: that 
the defendant clearly did not endorse the encouraging content of the publication? 
Seemingly not: this defence is nowhere to be seen in the case law, including in cases in 
which one would expect it to have been used, such as Mohammed.88 This suggests 
that the defence is more difficult to use than it first appears to be. It requires not only 
that one did not endorse the encouraging content, but also that this was clear in the 
circumstances. The burden of proving this might also lie on the defendant.89 Convincing 
a jury that one clearly did not endorse the encouraging content of a publication that one 
disseminated is perhaps seen as too difficult a task.  
 
Even if the defence were easier to use, however, it would not completely address the 
concerns raised here. Suppose that the legislation were re-drafted, such that 
endorsement of the publication’s encouraging content became a required element of the 
offence. That encouragement might still be very indirect, and the dissemination of the 
publication might carry little to no real risk of contributing to terrorism. The justifiability of 
these risks – including the potential value of the publication – would not be assessed 
any more robustly. Innocent and valuable forms of expression would thus still be 
restricted. Avoiding suspicion might correspondingly remain difficult for those who sell 
certain types of material, or who hold certain controversial views. In short, the lack of an 
endorsement requirement is not the only problem with an offence extending so far 
beyond direct incitement of terrorism. Even if there is a principled case for such an 
offence, its costs seem likely to outweigh its benefits at its margins.  
 
                                                          
87 See further Choudhury (n 58) 472–473, 481–486. 
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Fortunately, and unlike with the preparation offence, courts could yet help to address 
these concerns – although again, Parliament would have to act to remedy the worst of 
them. Consider first the mens rea of the offence. Recklessness should not suffice for 
this: Parliament should consider requiring intention to encourage, in accordance with 
the relevant international obligations.90 But until it makes this change, courts could 
improve their handling of cases of unintentional encouragement. First and foremost, 
they should be sure to require proof of recklessness in these cases. Second, they could 
develop the non-endorsement defence: for example, by holding that it imposes only an 
evidential burden. Thus, the prosecution would normally have to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that the defendant actually endorsed the encouraging content of the 
publication – or at least, that their non-endorsement was not made clear.  
 
Third, courts could be invited to develop directions on what constitutes an unreasonable 
risk of encouragement. Such a direction might highlight several factors, based on the 
discussion above. On the one hand, juries should consider the seriousness of the risk of 
encouragement. Relevant considerations here include the seriousness and extent of the 
harm encouraged, as well as the probability of the audience’s being encouraged. Mere 
exposure to propaganda, it might also be noted, does not necessarily create such a risk. 
On the other hand, juries should consider whether the defendant had good reasons for 
disseminating the publication. These might include the potential social value of both the 
publication itself and the freedom to express controversial opinions openly. While the 
balance between these competing factors must ultimately remain a question for the jury, 
such a direction would at least help to focus their deliberations correctly.  
 
More fundamentally, courts could yet provide a narrowing interpretation of “indirect 
encouragement”. One such interpretation – which the Court of Appeal approved in the 
case of Faraz – is that if encouragement is not expressed by the publication, then it 
must be necessarily implied.91 On this interpretation, the offence would still catch 
glorification and justification of terrorism. But it would not catch mere depictions or 
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discussions of terrorism, simply on the basis that these might have encouraging effects. 
As we have seen, this interpretation would be consistent with both the wording and the 
purpose of the 2006 Act. Combined with an affirmation that clear non-endorsement is a 
defence, it would help to mitigate the offence’s impact on freedom of expression. 
Unfortunately, in the more recent case of Ali, the Court of Appeal refused to require a 
direction in these terms. In fact, they doubted whether any elaboration should be given 
of “indirect encouragement”.92 The Court might still be invited to prefer its approach in 
Faraz, however, should the issue arise again.  
 
A final reason for courts to develop the law in these ways is their duty to read down 
legislation to ensure compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights93 – 
specifically, the right to freedom of expression under Article 10. To date, courts have 
rejected any such reading of the dissemination offence. According to two early cases, 
acts that are intended to encourage or are reckless as encouraging terrorism are not 
protected by Article 10 simply because they express a political or religious view.94 In Ali, 
the Court of Appeal rightly accepted that such acts are protected by Article 10. 
However, they were equally quick to hold that the infringement is justified, given the 
offence’s definition: the prohibition of intentional or reckless encouragement, they held, 
is “clearly lawful, proportionate and necessary”.95 
 
These decisions are not decisive against a reading down of the dissemination offence. 
For they were reached largely without argument, and without reference to the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence. This suggests that, while the offence pursues a legitimate 
aim in infringing freedom of expression, it might do so disproportionately in some cases. 
In determining the proportionality of prohibitions on political speech, crucial 
considerations have been whether there was intentional incitement of violence, and 
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whether an actual danger of violence was created.96 Clearly, these criteria cast doubt 
on the compatibility with Article 10 of some of the convictions discussed above. While 
English courts have so far been dismissive about the relevance of the Convention in this 
context, it could thus provide further justification for a narrowing interpretation of the 
offence.  
 
4. Collecting, Possessing, or Viewing Terrorist Information 
 
Collection of terrorist information was criminalised by section 58 of the Terrorism Act 
2000. The actus reus of the offence is collecting, recording, possessing, or viewing via 
the internet information “of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing 
an act of terrorism”.97 The “viewing online” mode of commission was added in 2019. 
The required mens rea is knowledge of the nature of the information.98 It is a defence 
that the defendant had a “reasonable excuse” for his or her collection, possession, or 
viewing of the information.99 No further definition of this defence is provided, although 
the 2019 reforms specified that academic research and work as a journalist constitute 
reasonable excuses.100 The maximum sentence was also increased from 10 to 15 
years’ imprisonment.101  
 
Courts have faced two difficult questions in interpreting this offence. First, what 
information satisfies the actus reus? What counts, that is, as information “likely to be 
                                                          
96 These principles were mostly developed in cases involving measures targeting Kurdish separatists in 
Turkey: e.g. Ceylan v Turkey (2000) 30 EHRR 73; Baskaya and Okçuoglu v Turkey (2001) 31 EHRR 10; 
Erdogdu v Turkey (2002) 34 EHRR 50. See further the analyses in Hunt (n 58) 450–452, 456–457; SA 
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Britain’ (2010) 42 George Washington International Law Review 123, 152–155; Petzsche (n 63) 254–256. 
97 Terrorism Act 2000, s. 58(1). 
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99 Terrorism Act 2000, s. 58(3). 
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useful to” a prospective terrorist? Second, what counts as a “reasonable excuse” for 
possessing such information? Following a series of cases in the Court of Appeal,102 the 
House of Lords was required to settle both questions in the 2009 case of R v G.103 The 
most important point to emerge from this case is that terrorist intention, or lack thereof, 
is entirely irrelevant to this offence: the targeted mischief is the mere possession of 
certain types of information, so it is no defence simply that the information was 
possessed for a non-terrorist purpose.104 This case is now the starting point for any 
further interpretation of the offence, so it is worth examining its holdings, and their 
subsequent impact, in detail.  
 
Taking first the actus reus of the offence, the House of Lords held that the information 
must be of use to terrorists, rather than ordinary people. On a literal reading, much 
everyday information falls within the actus reus, since information that is useful to 
ordinary people might also be useful to prospective terrorists: for example, maps of 
cities or timetables for public transport. Assuming that Parliament could not have 
intended this absurd result,105 the court held that the offence was meant  
 
…to catch the possession of information which would typically be of use to 
terrorists, as opposed to ordinary members of the population. So, to fall within the 
section, the information must, of its very nature, be designed to provide practical 
assistance to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism… Of course, it 
is not necessary that the information should be useful only to a person 
committing etc an act of terrorism. For instance, information on where to obtain 
explosives is capable of falling within section 58(1), even though an ordinary 
crook planning a bank robbery might also find it useful.106 
 
                                                          
102 Culminating in the case of R v K [2008] EWCA Crim 185; [2008] QB 827. 
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104 For an analysis of the decision focusing on this point, see J Hodgson and V Tadros, ‘How to Make a 
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These remarks have failed to clarify the scope of the actus reus. By focusing on the 
practical utility of the information to prospective terrorists specifically, the court did 
somewhat narrow the scope of the offence.107 However, the passage above is 
ambiguous between two readings. The first relates to how the relevant information 
might be used: it must “typically be of use to terrorists, as opposed to ordinary members 
of the population”. The second relates to the purposes for which the information was 
designed: it must “be designed to provide practical assistance to” prospective terrorists. 
As subsequent cases show, there is continuing confusion between these two readings, 
and neither does much to clarify or narrow the offence’s scope.  
 
An example of the first reading, focusing on potential use, is the case of Muhammed.108 
The appeal in this case related to a file named “Draft ideas”, which contained a bullet-
point list of practical advice. This advice mainly concerned how to avoid detection by the 
authorities, and could have been useful to ordinary criminals, as well as prospective 
terrorists. Relying on G, the Court of Appeal found that this document fell within the 
scope of the offence. The actus reus requires only that the information is useful to 
prospective terrorists, and that it is not “in every day use by ordinary members of the 
public”.109 It is therefore irrelevant that the information has other uses besides terrorist 
uses, or even that it would be of limited use in the commission or preparation of a 
terrorist attack. 
 
An example of the second reading, focusing on the purpose for which the information 
was designed, is the case of Amjad.110 This appeal related to a list of physical exercises 
headed “Mujahid minimum training”. Again, the Court of Appeal relied on G in finding 
that this hand-written fitness regime satisfied the actus reus. Despite some confused 
                                                          
107 Consider, for example, the earlier case of R v Malik [2008] EWCA Crim 1450. Some of the charges in 
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remarks on the point,111 the court’s decision was ultimately premised on the 
information’s having been designed by and for prospective terrorists. Hence, the 
prosecution was allowed to lead evidence that the fitness regime was very similar to a 
document found on the internet, which was “derived from sources associated with the 
terrorist cause”.112 The result would have been different on the first reading: fitness 
regimes, even ones with the word “Mujahid” at the top of them, are presumably useful to 
ordinary people. On this reading, however, it was sufficient for the actus reus that the 
document had a terrorist source.  
 
On either reading, the actus reus of the offence remains both broad and vague. To 
illustrate, consider an earlier case, in which a court sentenced an offender to six years’ 
imprisonment for possessing the address of a serving soldier.113 How should this case 
be treated now? Courts have suggested that, for example, a list of cabinet ministers’ 
names and addresses would fall within the actus reus.114 But should the address of a 
single soldier be treated differently? Adopting the first reading, is this information more 
likely to be considered “in everyday use by ordinary people”? Or, adopting the second, 
would it make a difference if the address had been written down by a known terrorist, or 
circulated by them as the address of a potential target? It is difficult to know how to 
answer these questions, or even which is the correct one to ask. This illustrates once 
again the role that courts have played in aggravating the problems with terrorism 
offences.  
 
Turning next to the reasonable excuse defence, the House of Lords held in G that this 
requires an “objectively reasonable” explanation for collecting or possessing the 
information.115 They left unclear, however, which explanations might count as such. 
                                                          
111 For example: “‘Designed’ need not import the maker of the document having in mind practical 
assistance. It is sufficient that by its nature the information is designed to provide it”: [2016] EWCA Crim 
1618, at [27]. Answers on a postcard as to how something can be designed to provide assistance without 
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Instead, whether an explanation is reasonable is left to the jury as a question of fact, 
which will turn on “the particular facts and circumstances of the individual case”.116 
Accordingly, an explanation will fall outwith the defence as a matter of law only if no jury 
could regard it as reasonable. As the Court of Appeal has since clarified, explaining 
one’s possession of information will mean explaining the purpose behind that 
possession. Defendants, that is, must offer evidence that they had good reason for their 
possession of the information; whether those reasons are indeed good ones is then for 
the jury to decide.117 
 
This approach is a double-edged sword for defendants. On the one hand, it allows them 
to offer a wide range of reasons for possession in their defence. Some explanations 
cannot provide good reasons for possessing terrorist information, as a matter of law: for 
example, mental illness, or a criminal purpose other than a terrorist purpose.118 But 
beyond these few cases, judges must leave juries to decide whether the defendant’s 
reasons were good ones. Thus, in the case of Brown, freedom of expression was 
correctly left to the jury as a potential reasonable excuse.119 And in Y, a purpose of self-
defence against invading or occupying forces – effectively, as the appellate court 
acknowledged, a purpose of supporting one side in a civil war – was also so left.120 
Even if juries are unlikely to accept such purposes as reasonable, defendants at least 
have the chance to convince them otherwise.  
 
On the other hand, this approach leaves uncertain which reasons for possession juries 
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will and should regard as “objectively reasonable”. This is especially striking in relation 
to innocent reasons for possession. The absence of a terrorist purpose, in and of itself, 
is not a reasonable excuse; rather, juries must evaluate non-terrorist purposes on a 
case-by-case basis. Again, Parliament has recently provided welcome clarification that 
academic and journalistic work count as reasonable excuses. But it remains uncertain 
whether the defence includes such reasons for possession as personal interest or 
simple curiosity.121 While juries must certainly be allowed to consider these as potential 
reasonable excuses, they lack guidance on whether and when they should accept them 
as such.  
 
The fundamental problem with the collection of information offence is thus that it 
remains unclear – indeed, the case law has made it even less clear – what mischief the 
offence targets. The G court made clear that the mischief lies in the nature of the 
information possessed, rather than the purpose behind its possession. But exactly what 
information is targeted, and why, remains mysterious. This lack of clarity creates 
practical problems. It makes it hard to know whom we ought to prosecute for 
possessing what, and what reasons for possession we ought to accept in their defence. 
But it is also problematic in principle. We need to know how we can justify convicting 
people and sending them to prison for possessing – or now, even merely looking at – 
information of certain types.  
 
To be fair to the courts, this lack of clarity is not entirely their fault. For many argue that 
offences of mere possession are unjustifiable in principle: no satisfactory account can 
be given of the mischief that they target. Conviction and punishment, this argument 
goes, might sometimes be warranted for those who possess dangerous items. For 
example, possessors might intend to use the item as part of their own criminal plans, or 
create an unreasonable risk that others will use it harmfully. But as Ashworth and Husak 
point out, mere possession of the item does not entail such risks. Therefore, they claim, 
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possession offences should not be created without further restrictions on their scope.122 
This argument is most often made in relation to offences of weapon possession, but it 
might be applied equally to this offence – again, perhaps even more forcefully so, now 
that it extends to mere viewing of information.  
 
Once again, however, others disagree with this restrictive view. Criminal law may act, 
as Horder puts it, in an “anticipatory” or preventive way, as well as a purely responsive 
one.123 Even if conduct is innocent in itself, we might be justified in prohibiting it, if doing 
so will prevent harm to which the conduct might contribute. And if the prohibition is just 
– if it strikes a fair balance between liberty and security interests – then breaching it 
might warrant conviction and punishment.124 This view might not fully address the 
critics’ concerns: even breach of a just prohibition will likely remain innocent in some 
cases. Advocates of this view disagree among themselves about how best to respond 
to this worry.125 For the sake of argument, however, let us assume that it can be 
addressed. Might this view provide a convincing rationalisation of the collection of 
information offence? 
 
Prohibiting the collection of information that is useful to terrorists might surely have 
some preventive benefits. Perhaps the possession of such information is innocent in 
itself; however, by prohibiting this, we restrict the availability of the information, and 
thereby make it more difficult for prospective terrorists to prepare terrorist attacks. This 
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rationalisation perhaps tells against the second, purpose-based reading of the actus 
reus: the purpose for which information was designed does not imply anything about its 
practical utility. But it supports the first reading, based on the potential uses of the 
information. If information is useful to terrorists but not to ordinary people, then by 
definition, its restriction will impede prospective terrorists without restricting most 
people’s liberties.  
 
Nevertheless, we should doubt that the collection of information offence is justifiable on 
this basis, for two reasons. First, its marginal preventive benefits are modest. As we 
have seen, it is irrelevant that the information concerned was widely available from 
other sources, or even that its practical utility to terrorists was limited. Besides the cases 
already mentioned, an illustrative recent example is a 2015 case, which related to two 
documents found, among thousands of innocuous ones, on the defendant’s laptop.126 
Again, these documents were conceded to be readily available elsewhere, and of 
limited practical use; indeed, both were in a language that the defendant himself could 
not read, and he had not accessed them in years. However, since their content related 
to violence and assassination, they fell within the offence. It is hard to see what 
preventive purpose is served by the facilitation of prosecutions like this one.  
 
Second, the offence has a serious impact on liberty interests. Again, this is due partly to 
the breadth of its actus reus: although information that is useful to ordinary people falls 
outwith the scope of the offence, much information that is useful for non-terrorist 
purposes might still fall within it. If a list of cabinet ministers’ addresses falls within the 
offence, then it is hard see why, say, detailed plans of the London Underground tunnel 
network would not do so. This concern is exacerbated by the uncertain scope of the 
reasonable excuse defence. Since innocent purposes might or might not fall within this, 
an obsession with metro systems might or might not excuse the possession of such 
plans. Ultimately, then, we have not progressed far from the absurd reading of the 
offence that the G court wanted to avoid.  
                                                          





One might object that, in practice, prosecutors and juries will not be rushing to condemn 
train enthusiasts. But in a way, that is precisely the point: whether one ends up in prison 
for possessing innocuous information now depends on a jury’s evaluation, or expected 
evaluation, of one’s reasons for doing so. The risk, of course, is that the fanatical 
interests of young Muslim men are not excused so readily.127 The prospect of their 
receiving lengthy custodial sentences for innocuous conduct, engaged in for innocent 
purposes, seems disturbingly real. 
 
In summary, the practical implementation of the collection of information offence raises 
serious concerns. The law suffers from a lack of doctrinal clarity: it is hard to say for 
sure either what information the offence catches, or what counts as a reasonable 
excuse for collecting, possessing, or viewing it. But this reflects a lack of principled 
clarity. The only available explanation for why we would create such an offence is to 
restrict the availability of certain types of information to prospective terrorists. But this 
explanation cannot justify the law as it stands. Too much innocent conduct is restricted, 
and too few realistic preventive benefits achieved, to justify the offence at its margins. 
Overall, the collection of information offence is difficult to accept as a legitimate use of 
the criminal law. 
 
The House of Lords, through its decision in G, must take some responsibility for these 
problems. In making this decision, the court overruled the previous leading authority: the 
Court of Appeal case of K. According to the K court, the mischief targeted by the 
offence was not information of a specific type, but rather the early stages of terrorist 
preparation.128 Hence, the actus reus required information that, by its nature, raised 
suspicion that it was to be used for a terrorist purpose; correspondingly, lack of such a 
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purpose constituted a reasonable excuse.129 Compared to the interpretation in G, this 
interpretation was both narrower and arguably more faithful to Parliament’s intention.130 
However, reverting to it would require the Supreme Court to overrule G. It is uncertain 
whether it would or should do this, simply on the basis that the earlier approach has 
proved preferable.131 
 
Indeed, courts are probably now unable to effect significant reform to the collection of 
information offence. The Court of Appeal could make some modest improvements: for 
example, preferring the “of use to terrorists” approach to the actus reus to the confused 
“designed for terrorists” approach. But these will not solve the most serious problems 
with the offence. Fundamentally, there is no credible definition of “information likely to 
be useful to a terrorist” that does not also catch material that is useful to non-
terrorists.132 Challenges on human rights grounds are also unlikely to succeed. 
Although key elements of the offence remain hugely vague, the Strasbourg court has 
found the post-G law compatible with the minimal standard of certainty required by the 
European Convention.133 Rather, any reform addressing these problems would have to 
come from Parliament. Unfortunately, the offence is clearly meant to continue playing a 
central role – to the extent Parliament only recently expanded its scope and increased 
its maximum penalty. Such reform therefore seems unlikely to be forthcoming.  
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5. Concluding Reflections 
 
What broader conclusions emerge from these case studies? Three points can be 
mentioned in closing, all related to the offences’ remarkable breadth. First, their 
apparent breadth on paper has largely been reflected in practice. This was, to an extent, 
inevitable: some of the most problematic elements of the offences are either clear from 
or made explicit in the statute. But some other elements are problematic because of 
interpretive choices that courts have made, or so far failed to confront. Notably, courts 
have avoided construing the offences narrowly where this would have been possible. In 
the one instance where a narrowing construction was unavoidable, in the G case, the 
court chose a construction that remained conspicuously and unnecessarily broad. 
Likewise, while prosecutors have shown some restraint in pursuing cases on the 
margins of the offences, they have also pursued some cases of the most problematic 
types that the offences catch.  
 
Second, and relatedly, the offences show signs of “mission creep”. Again, this was to an 
extent inevitable from the legislation: all three offences are drafted more broadly than 
their ostensible purpose demands. But the exercises of prosecutorial and judicial 
discretion just mentioned have also contributed to this result. Particularly in relation to 
the dissemination and collection of information offences, they have either failed to limit 
or even further extended the scope of the offences, relative to their original purpose. 
This is ironic, given that the potential exercise of discretion has been used as a 
justification for defining these offences in over-inclusive ways.134 It is also a point of 
broader importance, since analogous justifications are often also used outside of the 
terrorism context.135  
 
Finally, all three offences seem not only unnecessary but also unjustifiable in their 
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breadth. This is not to say that they are objectionable in principle, even as presently 
drafted and interpreted: although some would argue this, others would argue that a 
principled case for each offence could potentially be made. Rather, it is to say that they 
strike a questionable balance between liberty and security at their margins. All three 
offences have been used for conduct that contributes little or nothing to the risk of 
terrorist attacks. All either catch or risk catching conduct that is innocent or positively 
valuable. And while chilling effects are difficult to prove, the risk of them in all three 
cases seems real and significant. Overall, both the courts and Parliament ought to 
consider how the scope of these offences might in future be narrowed. Unfortunately, 
both the capacity of the former and the willingness of the latter to do so seem now to be 
limited.  
